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Summary findings
High-quality  institutions-reflected in such  factors as  In countries  where the institutions  are good enough,
rule of law,  bureaucratic  quality,  freedom  from  however,  ethnic diversity  does not lessen  growth or
government  expropriation,  and freedom  from  worsen  economic  policies.
government  repudiation  of contracts-mitigate the  Good institutions  also reduce  the risk  of wars and
adverse  economic  effects  of ethnic  fractionalization  genocides  that might  otherwise  result from ethnic
identified  by Easterly  and Levine  (1997)  and others.  fractionalization.  However,  these  forms  of violence  are
Ethnic  diversity  has  a more  adverse  effect  on economic  not the channel  through which  ethnic fragmentation  and
policy  and growth  when a government's  institutions  are  its interaction  with institutions  affect  economic  growth.
poor. But poor institutions  have  an even  more adverse  Ethnically  diverse  nations  that want to endure in peace
effect  on growth and policy  when ethnic diversity  is high.  and prosperity  must build good institutions.
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Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?'
William Easterly
World Bank
I Some  of the results  in this  paper are based on earlier  unpublished  work  with Ross  Levine.3
In 88 BC, King Mithriadates VI of Pontus invaded Roman territory in Asia Minor. He
encouraged Asian debtors to kill their Roman creditors. Happy to reduce their credit card
bills, the Asians massacred 80,000 Romans.'
Ethnic conflict is a tragic constant of human history. Ethnic conflict is still very
much in the news today, from the Balkans to Central Africa to Indonesia to Nigeria.
Ethnic conflict has a peaceful political dimension as well as the more publicized violent
dimension. Recently, the economics literature has studied the effects of ethnic conflict on
economic development.
Easterly and Levine [1997] document an adverse effect of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization on income, growth, and economic policies.  They offer this as an
explanation for Africa's poor growth performance. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999a
find that more ethnically diverse cities and counties in the US spend less on public goods.
Goldin and Katz 1999 find lower public support for higher education in states with more
religious - ethnic heterogeneity. Goldin and Katz 1997 likewise find lower high school
graduation rates in states that had higher religious-ethnic diversity. Miguel 1999 likewise
finds lower primary school funding in more ethnically diverse districts in Kenya. Mauro
1995 and La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1998 find that ethnic diversity
predicts poor quality of government services. Mauro 1995 and Annett 1999 finds that
linguistic or religious diversity leads to greater political instability, which Annett finds in
turn leads to higher government consumption. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999b find a
link from ethnic diversity to bloated government payrolls in US cities.  Rodrik 1999
noted that ethnically polarized nations react more adversely to external terms of trade
shocks. Svensson 1998 finds that more foreign aid proceeds are diverted into corruption4
in more ethnically diverse places. Knack and Keefer 1997 find that ethnic homogeneity
raises "social capital" or "trust," which in turn is associated with faster growth and higher
output per worker. Alesina and La Ferrara 2000 and Zak and Knack 1999 also find that
ethnic heterogeneity lowers "trust," using US data and cross-country data, respectively.
Alesina and La Ferrara 1999 find that higher ethnic heterogeneity makes participation in
social clubs less likely in the US, which is consistent with the idea that there is not much
association across groups. Adelman and Morris 1967 also noted that "cultural and ethnic
heterogeneity tend to hamper the early stages of nation-building and growth." 2
There is a large political science literature that describes the formation of
ethnically based political blocs. Rothchild (1991), one of the leading scholars of ethnic
politics, avers that "ethnic and other rivalries" over "distributive goods" are "far-
reaching"(p. 195).3  For example, in Zambia, Scarritt (1993) describes how the Nyanja
group (15 percent of the population) was in power through 1991 under the undemocratic
rule of Kenneth Kaunda. The Bemba group (37 percent of the population) had been
discriminated against under Kaunda because he feared they were opposition
sympathizers. Food riots against the first IMF agreements in the late 80s took place
primarily among the Bemba population. In democratic elections that were finally held in
1991, the Bemba group led the winning coalition, while the party supported by the
Nyanja lost.
In Nigeria, likewise, the predominant (albeit far from the only) ethnic split has
been between the Muslim North and the Christian South. Collier [1995] states flatly:
"the Nigerian government is a Northern interest group. This group has never
relinquished power since independence." Ake [1996] concludes that most of Nigeria's5
elites "place their Nigerian identity below that of their local community, nation, or ethnic
group" [p. 67].  Although Nigeria is a constitutional federation, the states rely on
handouts of oil money from the central government. Oil is actually produced in the
South. The competition for rents from oil often seems to divert resources away from
human capital accumulation (as predicted by Tornell and Lane 1999). For example,
public spending in Nigeria during the oil boom in the early 1990s increased by more than
50 percent, yet over the same period school enrollment shrunk due to tight education
funding.  The Nigerian dissident writer Wole Soyinka (1996) notes that a government-
appointed commission of inquiry was unable to account for what happened to much of
the 1990s government oil windfall.  Most recently, a Southerner has finally become
President of Nigeria under democratic elections, but tensions continue between Northern
and Southern groups over issues like the introduction of Islamic law in Northern states.
The current Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, summed up the political
economy of Africa in a speech at Harvard. He notes "ethnic, religious, and other sources
of diversity are the hall-marks of African societies" and "Rent-seeking in our economies
is not a more or less important phenomenon as would be the case in most economies. It is
the centerpiece of our economies (Zenawi 2000)."
Ethnic groups may act selfishly in their own interest, because they may receive
only spillovers from the human capital or knowledge of those in their own ethnic or
neighborhood group (what Borjas 1992, 1995, 1999 has called "ethnic capital"). Case and
Katz 1991 found there were strong neighborhood effects on economic and social
outcomes for Boston inner city youths. Benabou 1993 and Durlauf 1996 suggest that
inequality persists through neighborhood externalities, local school finance, and6
endogenous segregation between rich and poor. Casella and Rauch 1997 argue that
exporters with an ethnic connection to business groups inside the importing country have
an advantage over those without such ties. The existence of "ethnic capital" makes for
persistent income differentials between ethnic groups, which may exacerbate ethnic
tensions. In Mexico, for example, the poverty rate among indigenous people is 81
percent, while it is only 18 percent among non-indigenous Mexicans. 4 Ethnic inequality
may lead to some poor groups being unable to finance human capital accumulation, with
such inequality lowering growth, as argued in general for inequality and growth by Galor
and Zeira 1993. The exclusion of some ethnic groups from enterprise and human capital
formation lowers the productive potential of the society that excludes them.
I. Growth regression with Institutions
Political economy explanations of development outcomes usually focus on
"society's polarization and degree of social conflict" (Alesina 1994, p. 38). Societies that
are ethnically divided are plausibly more prone to "polarization" and "social conflict."
The adverse effect of ethnic diversity on growth may stem from the political economy
"wars of attrition" (Alesina and Drazen 1991) that take place between ethnic groups.
(Easterly and Levine 1997 found that this ethnic effect was not proxying for real wars
fought along ethnic lines, because ethnic diversity was still significant after controlling
for civil war). Each ethnically-based interest group tries to free ride on inflation
stabilization, trade opening, privatization, or another costly policy reform, hoping that the
costs will be borne by the group that initiates the reform. Although we could capture
such policy reforms directly in the growth equation, there are many structural reformns
that are hard to measure (such as lowering price distortions or privatization), so ethnic7
diversity may show up in the growth equation because it represents a bad political
economy equilibrium in some unmeasurable policies.
To change the metaphor, multiple ethnic groups are subject to "the tragedy of the
commons" as each ethnic group over-extracts from a common resource like commodity
export rents. Rather than protecting a valuable resource like cocoa plantations, in which a
country might have a growth-promoting comparative advantage, ethnic groups may each
try to extract rents from the commodity (with a strong incentive to get the rents before the
other group does) until commodity producers are discouraged from producing.  Such a
bad political economy equilibrium with polarized ethnic groups can literally, to keep
adding metaphors, "kill the goose that lays the golden egg."
Lower "trust" between diverse ethnic groups make it difficult to form the social
networks ("social capital") that promote growth by disseminating advanced technology
and economically useful knowledge, as argued by the literature cited above. Ethnic
groups may have difficulty agreeing on the type of public goods, leading to less total
spending on growth-promoting public goods -- as documented for US cities and counties
by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999a. Again, we could measure such public services
directly, but many of them are hard to observe directly. Ethnic diversity may then have a
direct effect on growth through its effect on unobserved public services.
Institutions that give legal protection to minorities, guarantee freedom from
expropriation, grant freedom from repudiation of contracts, and facilitate cooperation for
public services would constrain the amount of damage that one ethnic group could do to
another. Such pro-business rules of the game may prevent ethnic groups from
expropriating business owners of a different ethnic group. Good institutions would thus8
plausibly make a given amount of ethnic fractionalization less damaging for
development. We can think of an interaction effect between quality of institutions and
ethnic diversity that would work something like this:
(Ethnic conflict) =  f(Ethnic diversity, Institutional quality)
where fl>O,  f2<0, and a 2(Ethnic conflict)/(dEthnic diversityaInstitutional quality)<0. 5
As a corollary, formal institutions that protect minorities and establish clear legal
rules for business may be more valuable in ethnically divided societies than in
homogeneous ones. In ethnically homogeneous societies, the web of social networks
spanning the whole society will spawn informal institutions ("social capital" or "trust")
that provide assurance against expropriation or breaking contracts.  In ethnically divided
societies, formal institutions fill the gap left by lower "social capital," and therefore are
more productive at the margin than in homogeneous societies.
Poor institutions in Africa may reinforce the ethnolinguistic fractionalization
explanation for Africa's poor performance. Many studies of Africa cite the hostile
institutional environment as a factor explaining Africa's poor growth performance (see
World Bank [1994]). These studies argue that the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully
and quickly, to conduct business where the rules of the game are clear, and to have
confidence in the bureaucracy may all influence investment and allocation decisions. In a
society with ethnic conflict, such institutional shortcomings may be disastrous. Mauro
[1995] and Knack and Keefer [1995] argue that corruption and other institutional factors
are correlated with economic growth using data from country risk services for
international investors.9
Good institutions may thus mitigate ethnically-based social conflict that lowers
growth. I find that the ethnic effect in the original Easterly and Levine 1997 growth
regressions disappear if institutions are of sufficiently high quality. I average Knack and
Keefer's  [1995] measures from the International Country Risk Guide of (a)freedom from
government repudiation of contracts, (b) freedom from expropriation, (c) rule of law, and
(d) bureaucratic quality into an overall index of institutional quality.  Data are available
for many of the years in the 1980s. I average these across years 1980-1989 in computing
the overall institutional quality index. Then, as in Barro [1997], I use the 1980s value for
the 1970s and 1960s under the assumption that institutional quality changes slowly.  This
index, INSTITUTIONS, has a maximum possible value of 10 and potential minimum of
0.  For example, Luxembourg has a institutional index value of 10, while Liberia and the
Sudan have values of 2.9 and 2.7 respectively.  Note that I am not directly measuring the
political and social institutions that might foster, for example, rule of law. Rather I am
measuring, as do others in the literature, the outcomes of institutional arrangements.
INSTITUTIONS is highly correlated (.87) with the general institutional ranking
of the Business Environment Risk Guide (BERI) for 1980-1989 reported by Knack and
Keefer 1995.6  BERI data covers the 1970s and 1980s, so I can check my assumption of
persistence over time. I find a correlation of .95 between the BERI averages for 1970-
1979 and 1980-1989. I prefer to-use the ICRG data however, because they cover more
countries and because they were  the principal variable in the seminal Knack and Keefer
1995 study.10
INSTITUTIONS is also highly correlated with corruption.  INSTITUTIONS has a
correlation of .8 with Mauro's [1995] 1980-1983 index of corruption, which in turn has a
correlation of .88 with Knack and Keefer's [1995] 1980-1989 index of corruption.
In Table I, I add the interaction term, INSTITUTIONS*ETHNIC to the most
complete growth regression of Easterly and Levine 1997. The data still demonstrate that
ethnic diversity is negatively associated with long-run growth. However, Table I's
results imply that sound institutional arrangements mitigate the negative effects of ethnic
diversity. 7 Indeed, the results indicate that ethnic diversity has a zero marginal effect on
economic growth at maximum institutional development (INSTITUTIONS equal to 10).
Because of concern about possible autocorrelation of the error terms in the pooled data, I
also do the regression as a pure cross-section; I get similar results (Table I) on the ethnic
variable and its interaction with institutions, although some of the policy variables are no
longer significant in the small cross-section sample.
This result may be related to that of Collier 1999 that democracy eliminates the
adverse effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on growth. I test whether democracy is
more relevant than institutions by adding a variable ETHNIC*POLRIGHTS, where
POLRIGHTS is the Gastil index of political rights from 1 to 7, where 1 is the most
democratic.  This variable is insignificant, with the wrong sign and a t-statistic of only
.33. These results suggest that it is institutions rather than democracy that contain ethnic
conflict.
Another possible concern is that ethnic fragmentation and its interaction with
good institutions may simply be picking up the presence of violence destructive to
growth. However, when I control for a measure of intensity of war (war casualties onnational territory), the results on ETHNIC and its interaction with INSTITUTIONS are
unchanged, while the war variable is itself insignificant. Likewise, when I control for a
dummy variable measuring genocide (to be described below), I find the growth effects of
ETHNIC and its interaction with INSTITUTIONS to be unchanged, while genocide itself
does not significantly lower growth.
Finally, it may be that ethnically diverse societies with good institutions are those
that had less tension between groups to begin with.  This problem creates difficult
identification problems that I cannot resolve in this paper, but I do acknowledge the
possibility.
II.  Institutions. Ethnic Diversity, and Policy Choices
Next, I explore the effect of institutions on mitigating the adverse effects of ethnic
diversity on policy.  While ethnic diversity is given exogenously, countries may be able
to adopt institutional arrangements -- clear property rights, freedom from expropriation,
effective "rules of the game," and an efficient bureaucracy -- that mitigate the negative
repercussions of diverse interest groups. Clear rules of the game may substantially reduce
or eliminate costly rent-seeking behavior associated with ethnic diversity.  For example,
suppose that a multi-ethnic coalition is necessary to constitute a majority in an ethnically
diverse country. Ministries might be parceled out among the various ethnic leaders, who
seek gains for their own ethnic group at the expense of other ethnic groups. The ethnic
leader in charge of the central bank might set an artificially overvalued exchange rate to
tax commodity exporters (who may belong to a different ethnic group) and then hand out
cheap foreign exchange to ethnic supporters. The result would be a high black market
premium. The ethnic leader in charge of bank regulation might put controls on interest12
rates to tax savers, and then hand out cheap loans to ethnic supporters. The result would
be a negative real interest rate for depositors, flight of capital from the banking system,
and low M2 to GDP ratios, which King and Levine 1993 find to be bad for growth. This
kind of story applies to many ethnically diverse countries in Africa, where the commodity
exports are concentrated in one ethnic group (e.g. Ashantis in Ghana), savings in another
group (e.g. people of Indian origin in Kenya), and politicians belong to yet another group
(e.g. coastal ethnic groups in Ghana, a coalition of the smaller African ethnic groups in
Kenya). A pro-business set of institutions would prohibit such implicit expropriation of
exporters and savers.
Alternatively, multiple ethnic groups might have conflicting interests on the kind
of public services delivered by the state, as argued by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999a.
For example, linguistically distinct groups would have different preferences for the
language of instruction in the schools. They might reach a compromrise  lingua franca like
Swahili, but they value schooling less because they cannot be taught in the language
spoken at home. This would lead to less resources devoted to the common good, and thus
lower schooling. Regionally separated groups might have trouble agreeing on the
location of telephone networks, and thus wind up investing less in such networks --
leading to lower telephone density. Good institutions like an independent and efficient
bureaucracy may be able to supercede such differences and act for the good of the nation
as a whole.
I examine whether sound institutions mitigate the negative effects of ethnic
fragmentation on policy choices by including the term INSTITUTIONS*ETHNIC in the
regressions for policy indicators from Easterly and Levine 1997. Thus, I regress13
measures of educational attainment, political stability, financial depth, the black market
exchange rate premium, the fiscal surplus, and the number of telephones per worker on
ETHNIC and the interaction term INSTITUTIONS  *ETHNIC. For educational
attainment, financial depth, the black market exchange rate premium (Figure 1), and the
number of telephones per worker, I find in OLS regressions that (1) ethnic diversity
causes a deterioration in the dependent variable (consistent with the results of Easterly
and Levine 1997) and (2) institutions significantly mitigate the negative effects of ethnic
diversity (Table II).  In fact, the results indicate that in countries with very highly
developed institutions, ethnic diversity does not significantly hurt policy choices.
Institutional arrangements can overcome the negative implications of ethnic diversity.
The coefficient magnitudes imply that the derivative of policies with respect to ETHNIC
actually changes sign at very high values of institutions.
Although this suggests a reform strategy that focuses on improving a country's
institutions, altering institutional arrangements is fundamentally more difficult than
changing, for example, exchange rate policies [see North, 1990] and World Bank [1995]].
Moreover, INSTITUTIONS is itself negatively correlated with ETHNIC (simple
correlation of -.33) -- so achieving a consensus for changing institutional rules of the
game may be even more difficult in an ethnically diverse country. 8
There may also be reverse causation from policies to institutions.  For example, a
black market premium creates incentives for corruption in foreign exchange allocation,
which could affect my measure of institutional quality.  Hence, I also conduct the
analysis instrumenting for my interaction term INSTITUTIONS*ETHNIC.14
I could follow Mauro [1995] in the idea of using colonial heritage as an
instrument. 9 However, the form of Mauro's variable (dummy variables for former
French colonies, former English colonies, etc.) is not suitable for this purpose since I
need to find instruments uncorrelated with my dependent variables -- policies.  National
colonial traditions seem to be correlated with the choice of policies (former French
colonies in Africa in the Franc Zone do not have black market premia, for example). A
more plausible instrument for my purposes is the length of time the country has been
independent, which could be interpreted as the length of time national institutions have
had to develop.  I normalize time since independence as the fraction of time since 1776 a
country has been independent, as of the initial year of the decade for each decade
observation.  I also use the product of ethnic diversity and initial income
(ETHNIC*INCOME) as an instrument, assuming that institutional development is a
function of general economic development as represented by income.
The results (Table II) show no effect of ETHNIC and ETHNIC*INSTITUTIONS
on the fiscal surplus and on the number of assassinations.10 This accords with the result
by Easterly and Levine 1997 that ethnic diversity does not affect the fiscal surplus or the
number of assassinations, so there is no effect for INSTITUTIONS to mitigate.
Like Easterly and Levine 1997, however, I find that ethnic diversity causes lower
schooling, less financial depth, a bigger black market exchange rate premium, and less
infrastructure. For these effects, I find that sound institutions eliminate the negative
effects of ethnic diversity on economic policies.  Furthermore, when I do include the less
than ideal instruments of colonial dummies for England, France, Spain, Portugal, etc., as
in Mauro [1995], the results remain unchanged.  I also tried instruments to account for15
natural endowments, such as Sachs and Warner's [1995,1999] natural resource
abundance measures, population size, and land area. The results were still unchanged.
I did a Hausman test of the over-identifying restrictions to see if
ETHNIC*INCOME and "years since independence" are indeed excludable from these
policy regressions."'  I fail to reject the over-identifying restrictions; that is, I find no
evidence that these instruments belong in the regression for policies directly.  This is
helpful since it tells us that institutions is not simply proxying for, say, income.  Of
course, the use of instrumental variables technique addresses causality only if the
instruments are truly exogenous, an assumption which seems more well grounded for the
years-since-independence variable than the income variable.  When I use only the years
since independence variable, or this variable combined with an interaction term (years-
since-independence times ETHNIC), the pattern of signs and significance is unchanged
(although coefficient magnitudes do shift).
I check whether this interaction term is really proxying for a direct effect of
INSTITUTIONS on policy choices. Perhaps societies with good institutions are simply
less prone to bad policy choices, regardless of their level of ethnic diversity.  I find that
ethnic diversity still causes lower schooling, lower telephone density, and lower financial
development, and that INSTITUTIONS still mitigate this effect. The results on the black
market premium are not robust to the inclusion of INSTITUTIONS separately, as the
regression cannot distinguish the effects of ETHNIC, INSTITUTIONS, or their
interaction.
III. War, institutions, and ethnic diversity16
Although war is not the main theme of Easterly and Levine 1997 and is not the
principal channel by which diversity affects growth, they do note that ethnic
fractionalization is correlated with war casualties on national territory (data from Sivard
1993). It is obvious from experience ranging from Afghanistan to Sudan that ethnic
conflict sometimes takes on this most violent of forms.  Hence, it is interesting to see if
good institutions that mitigate economic consequences of diversity can modify violent
ethnic conflict as well.
The last lines of Table II confirm that ethnic fractionalization increases the
likelihood of war casualties. However, once again good institutions are effective in
mitigating this threat.  Indeed at maximum quality institutions (INSTITUTIONS=10), the
effect of ethnic fractionalization on war is cancelled out all together. This accords well
with casual observation - ethnic differences may lead to civil war in Koscvo, Rwanda,
and Sudan, but they do not in Belgium, Canada, or Switzerland.
Collier and Hoeffler 1998 find that the relationship between duration of civil war
and ethnic diversity is quadratic, with peak civil war duration at ETHNIC=43. I tested a
quadratic term for ETHNIC in my civil war regression, but found both ETHNIC and
ETHNICA2  to be insignificant in this case. The interaction term between ETHNIC and
INSTITUTIONS continued to be significantly negative. The differing results from
Collier and Hoeffler 1998 may be explained by my use of a different measure of intensity
of civil war (casualties per capita rather than duration) and the inclusion of the
institutional interaction effect.17
I also tested whether INSTITUTIONS enters directly into the war casualties
equation. The regression was not able to distinguish the separate effects of ETHNIC,
INSTITUTIONS,  and their interaction.
IV. Genocide, institutions, and ethnic diversity
Another violent manifestation of ethnic conflict is genocide, defined as state-
sponsored killings whose victims are identified at least in part by their ethnic
classification. According to Harff and Gurr 1996 "Geno/politicide is the promotion,
execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents
- or in the case of civil war either of the contending authorities - that result in the deaths
of a substantial portion of a communal and/or politicized communal group."
The tragic history of genocide is a long one. A non-exclusive list of victims of
ethnic massacres over the last millenium includes: the Danes in Anglo-Saxon England in
1002, the Jews in Europe during the First Crusade 1096-99, the French in Sicily in 1282,
the French in Bruges in 1302, the Flemings in England in 1381, the Jews in Iberia in
1391, converted Jews in Portugal in 1507, the Huguenots in France in 1572, Protestants
in Magdeburg in 1631, Jews and Poles in the Ukraine in 1648-54, indigenous populations
in the US, Australia, and Tasmania in the 18th and 19th centuries, Jews in Russia in the
19th century, the French in Haiti in 1804, Arab Christians in Lebanon in 1841, Turkish
Armenians in 1895-96 and 1915-1916, Nestorian, Jacobite, and Maronite Christians in
the Turkish empire in 1915-16, Greeks in Smyma in 1922, Haitians in the Dominican
Republic in 1936, the Jewish Holocaust in German-occupied territory 1933-1945,
Serbians in Croatia in 1941, and Muslims and Hindus in British India in 1946-47.1218
Easterly and Levine 1997 noted that their measure of ethnolinguistic
fragmentation was significant and positive in a probit equation for the occurrence of
genocide. The measure they use (and I use here) is taken from Harff and Gurr 1996. Here
I use this data to construct a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if a genocide
(defined to include either "communal victims" or "mixed communal and political
victims" in Harff and Gurr's terminology) occurred at any time from 1960 to 1990.
There are 16 countries that had a genocide over this period according to Harff and Gurr's
classification. The 16 countries are Angola, Burundi, Burma-Myanmar, Ethiopia,
Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Kampuchea-Cambodia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and Zaire-Congo. Table III lists the dates and ethnic
victims of the genocidal killings for these 16 countries.
Here I investigate whether the presence of high quality institutions lowers the
probability of genocide for a given amount of ethnolinguistic fragmentation. Table IV
shows the results.  Regression [1] shows the basic result: ethnic fragmentation has a
significant and positive effect on the probability of genocide, while the interaction term
between ethnic fragmentation and INSTITUTIONS has a negative effect.  Higher quality
institutions make a given degree of ethnic diversity less likely to result in genocide.
Figure 2 illustrates this result.  Countries in the lowest third of institutional quality have
an increasing probability of genocide as ethnic fragmentation increases.  The probability
is all the way up to .5 in countries that are in the highest third of ethnic fragmentation and
the lowest third of institutional quality.  This group includes genocides in Angola,
Guatemala, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, and Zaire.
Conversely, countries in the upper two-thirds of institutional quality do not show
an increasing probability of genocide as ethnic fragmentation increases. Most striking of
all, countries in the upper third of institutional quality have NO genocides, regardless of
their level of ethnic diversity. Examples of countries with high ethnic fragmentation but
also high quality institutions include Canada, Malaysia, and Thailand.19
In regression [2], I examine whether INSTITUTIONS enters the probit equation
for genocide directly. As with some of my other results, the regression has trouble
distinguishing among ETHNIC, INSTITUTIONS, and their interaction.
In regression [3], I test whether institutional quality is simply  proxying for
democracy, using the well-known Gastil index for suppression of democratic rights.  The
interaction with democracy is insignificant, while the institutional quality interaction
effect remains significant. If we take institutional quality as a measure of economnic  and
legal freedoms, these seems to be more important than political freedoms in mitigating
the effect of ethnic diversity on the likelihood of genocide.
The price that this nation must pay for the continued oppression and exploitation of the
Negro or any other minority group is the price of its own destruction.
--Martin Luther King Jr.13
V. Conclusions
Previous studies (Knack and Keefer 1995, Mauro 1995) have found strong
institutional effects of corruption and lack of rule of law on economic growth. Easterly
and Levine 1997 found direct and indirect effects of ethnic diversity on economic growth.
I find that institutional factors interact with ethnic diversity, as they affect whether ethnic
conflict is destructive or is contained by the rules of the game. Ethnic diversity has a
more adverse effect on economic policy and growth when institutions are poor. To put it
another way, poor institutions have an even more adverse effect on growth and policy
when ethnic diversity is high. Conversely, in countries with sufficiently good institutions,
ethnic diversity does not lower growth or worsen economic policies. Good institutions
also lower the risk of wars and genocides that might otherwise result from ethnic
fractionalization. Ethnically diverse nations that wish to endure in peace and prosperity
must build good institutions.
This is a promising area for future research.  It may be that the INSTITUTIONS
variable is a proxy for more general legal safeguards for ethnic minorities. Economists
should do more case studies of successful and unsuccessful examples of ethnic groups20
co-existing within nations.  The study of oppression of one ethnic group by another is a
rich area for further investigation - what conditions facilitate or prevent oppression? How
much does the answer depend on initial inequality between ethnic groups?  How much
does the answer depend on the definition of ethnicity?  The study of ethnically-based war
and genocide is also a fruitful area for further research.  What can we learn from the
abundant historical data about the possible economic or social determinants of ethnic war
and genocide? What more can governments do to finally bring the sad history of ethnic
conflicts to an end?21
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Table I: Redoing Easterly and Levine 1997  Growth
Regressions: Cross-section  Averages and Pooled
Decades  (1960s,  1970s,  1980s)
Dependent  Variable:  Real Per Capita GDP  Growth
Estimation Method  Cross- Pooled OLS decade
section  data
averages
Dummy variable for Sub-  -0.023  -0.015
Saharan Africa  (-1.91)  (-2.15)
Dummy variable for L.  -0.017  -0.017
America and the Carribean  (-2.87)  (-4.24)
Log of initial Income  0.154  0.100
(3.07)  (3.92)
Square of log of initial income  -0.012  -0.008
(-3.63)  (-4.62)
Log of Schooling  0.006  0.009
(0.83)  (1.62)
Assassinations  5.677  -13.763
(0.461)  (-1.53)
Financial Depth  0.005  0.011
(0.72)  (1.69)
Black Market Premium  -0.006  -0.018
(-0.74)  (-3.27)
Fiscal Surplus/GDP  0.093  0.179
(1.63)  (4.30)
Log of Telephones per worker  0.006  0.004
(1.79)  (1.76)
INSTITUTIONS  0.002  0.001
(1 worst, 10  best)  (1.27)  (0.64)
ETHNIC*INSTITUTIONS  0.005  0.005
(2.05)  (1.98)
ETHNIC  -0.032  -0.039
(-1.96)  (-2.16)
No. of observations  39  171
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses. Decade
dummies not shown
See Easterly and Levine 1997 for data sources26
Table II: Determinants of Policy Indicators (Pooled  Decade Data except where otherwise  noted)
Independent varables
Dependent  Estimation  No. of
variable  Procedure  C  ETHNIC  ETHNIC*  INSTI-  R2 obs.
INSTITUTION TUTIONS
Log of Schooling  OLS  1.77  -0.873  0.18  265
(33.31)  (-8.06)
OLS  1.686  -1.992  0.260  0.37  249
(33.85)  (-12.12)  (9.70)
OLS-Cross  1.829  -1.898  0.242  0.355  86
section
(21.44)  (-6.69)  (4.84)
IV  1.613  -2.994  0.483  242
(31.00)  (-12.45)  (10.41)
IV  1.137  -2.181  0.346  0.076  242
(2.06)  (-2.46)  (2.37)  (0.89)
Assassinations  OLS  3.54E-05  -7.9E-06  0.00  314
(3.41)  (-0.45)
OLS  4.49E-05  0.0001  -2.5E-05  0.04  285
(3.69)  (2.38)  (-3.16)
OLS-Cross  5.08E-05  0.000156  -3.56E-05  0.04  97
section
(1.72)  (1.58)  (-2.01)
IV  3.52E-05  -5.21E-05  9.99E-06  280
(2.95)  (-1.63)  (1.14)
IV  1.64E-04  -2.52E-04  4.28E-05  -2.04E-05  280
(2.84)  (-2.33)  (2.08)  (-2.25)
Financial depth  OLS  0.471  -0.290
(15.28)  (-5.83)  0.10  300
OLS  0.465  -0.756  0.099  0.23  272
(14.35)  (-11.10)  (7.45)
OLS-Cross  0.561  -0.869  0.108  0.25  94
section
(11.80)  (-5.43)  (3.77)
IV  0.45  -1.008  0.155  270
(13.37)  (-10.28)  (7.01)
IV  0.578  -1.216  0.189  -0.020  270
(1.99)  (-2.59)  (2.39)  (-0.45)
Black market premium  OLS  0.110  0.240  0.04  316
(4.39)  (3.93)
OLS  0.139  0.877  -0.132  0.18  288
(5.35)  (7.48)  (-7.54)
OLS-Cross  0.232  1.026  -0.169  0.16  98
section
(3.17)  (4.16)  (-3.81)
IV  0.152  0.896  -0.15  277
(5.76)  (5.55)  (-4.93)
IV  0.364  0.539  -0.084  -0.034  277
(2.27)  (1.75)  (-1.62)  (-1.39)27
Table  II: Determinants  of Policy  Indicators  (continued)
Independent  variables
Dependent  Estimation  No. of
variable  Procedure  C  ETHNIC  ETHNIC*  INSTI-  R 2 obs.
INSTllUTION  TUTIONS
Fiscal surplus/GDP  OLS  -0.034  -0.014  0.01  227
(-7.38)  (-1.44)
OLS  -0.037  -0.045  0.007  0.03  214
(-7.57)  (-2.27)  (2.17)
OLS-Cross  -0.054  -0.067  0.014  0.04  79
section
(-4.70)  (-1.68)  (1.81)
IV  -0.035  -0.023  0.002  214
(-7.20)  (-1.17)  (0.52)
IV  -0.168  0.181  -0.031  0.021  214
(-3.27)  (2.21)  (-2.25)  (2.64)
Log of telephones per  OLS  4.863  -3.283  0.25  293
worker  (28.23)  (-10.54)
OLS  4.813  -7.722  0.930  0.53  274
(33.24)  (-18.28)  (12.44)
OLS-Cross  5.556  -8.608  1.003  0.64  88
section
(26.49)  (-11.77)  (7.82)
IV  4.55  -11.668  1.80  267
(30.48)  (-13.23)  (10.62)
IV  2.328  -8.132  1.230  0.343  267
(2.26)  (-4.35)  (3.99)  (2.24)
War casualties per capita  OLS  -0.00013  0.001628  321
(-0.38)  (2.45)
OLS  8.15E-05  0.00543  -0.0008  297
(0.23)  (4.63)  (-3.75)
OLS-Cross  0.001  0.010  -0.001  0.04  97
section
(0.51)  (1.84)  (-1.30)
IV  5.42E-06  0.004477  -0.00057  276
(0.01)  (3.06)  (-2.02)
IV  2.36E-04  7.31E-03  -9.86E-04  1.67E-05  276
(0.13)  (1.55)  (-1.24)  (0.06)
t-statistics in parentheses. Instruments: ETHNIC, (Initial Income)*ETHNIC,
Percentage of years since 1776 as an independent country28
Table III: Lists of genocidal killings, 1960-90 (from Harff and Gurr
1996)
country  Dates 2 Communal Victims 3
ANGOLA  1961-62  Kongo tribe
BURUNDI  1965-73,  Hutu leaders (65-73)
1988  Hutu civilians (88)
MYANMAR  1978  Muslims
ETHIOPIA  1984-89  Tigreans
EQUATORIAL  1969-  Bubi tribe
GUINEA  1979
GUATEMALA  1966-84  Indians
INDONESIA  1965-66,  Ethnic Chinese (65-66),
1975-end  East Timorese (75-end)
of sample
CAMBODIA  1975-79  Muslim Chams
NIGERIA  1966  Ibos living in the North
PAKISTAN  1971,  Bengali nationalists (71), Baluchi (73-77)
1973-77
PARAGUAY  1962-72  Ache Indians
RWANDA  1963-64,  Tutsi ruling class (63-64)
1994  Tutsis, moderate Hutus (94)
SUDAN  1956-72,  Non-Muslim African Southerners (56-72)
1983-end  Dinka, Shilluk, Nuba (83-end)
of sample
SOMALIA  1988-89  Issak clan (Northerners)
UGANDA  1971-79,  Karamojong, Acholi, Lango (71-79),
1979-86  Karamojong, Nilotic, Bagandans (79-86)
ZAIRE  1964-65  Europeans
2 When  episodes  began,  ended,  or repeated  out of the sample  dates,  I show those dates  also.
3 Includes  Harff  and Guff  categories  "communal  victims"  and "mixed  communal  and political  victims"29
Table IV: Probit  equation  for genocide  (dummy=1  if genocide  occurred  during  1960-90)
Regression  [1]  [2]  [3]
C  -1.72  -0.583  -1.69
z-statistic  -4.41  -0.42  -3.99
Ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  (ELF),  5.40  3.685  4.06
1960
z-statistic  3.87  1.53  1.81
ELF*Institutions  (80s)  -0.99  -0.627  -0.97
z-statistic  -2.87  -1.10  -2.61
Institutions  -0.237
z-statistic  -0.78
ELF*Suppression  of democracy  (70-90)  0.21
z-statistic  0.69
Observations  99  99  9330
F%igue  1L  Black  nurkt praun.M eihul  divarsy,  earlftd
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IBell-Fialkoff  1996,  p. 10-11
2 p. 41, Adelman  and  Morris 1967.
3 This analysis by social scientists represents a long tradition. See e.g. Greenberg (1980) who
notes the "continuing reality of racial and ethnic domination." (p.5)
4Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994,  p. 6
5  This  is similar  to the formula  proposed  by Rodrik  1999  for response  to shocks.
6  The BERI  index is made  up of measures  of (l)Bureaucratic  Delay,  (2) Contract  Enforceability,
(3)Nationalization  Risk,  and (4) Infrastructure  Quality.
7Collier  has a related  result, that  democracy  eliminates  the adverse  effect  of ethnic  fragmentation  on
growth.
8Mauro  1995  earlier  noted an association  between  ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  and corruption.
9,  A similar  idea is Barro's [1997]  use  of (Spanish)  colonial  heritage  as an instrument  for inflation.
10.  I also failed  to find any  effect  on the other  8 measures  of political  instability  mentioned  in Easterly
and Levine,  with  the exception  of constitutional  changes,  which  matches  their results.
'l  See  the description  in Greene,  p. 617. I form  residuals  from the two  stage least regression,  then
regress  them  on all of the exogenous  variables  (ETHNIC,  INCOME*ETHNIC,  YRSINDEP).  The test
statistic  is equal to N times  the R2 of the second  regression,  where  N is the number  of observations.  The
test statistic  is distributed  x2 with  one degree  of freedom  (two  excluded  exogenous  variables  minus  one
endogenous  variable).
12 Bell-Fialkoff  1996,  p. 10-11
13 From  http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/speeches/Speech_at_the_great_march_on_detroit.htmlPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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